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Abstract The main aim of the paper is to reconstruct and analyse two method-
ological approaches to the problem of universals, presented in Bochen´ski’s papers
‘‘Powszechniki jako tres´ci cech w filozofii s´w. Tomasza z Akwinu’’ and ‘‘The
Problem of Universals.’’ It is argued that, although these approaches are rather
different from historical and methodological points of view, they are still based on
the same ontological ground, viz. on immanent realism. The article provides a
detailed analysis and comparison of the respective views. Justification is provided
for the claim that Bochen´ski was an immanent realist and some of Bochen´ski’s
detailed solutions are highlighted that may be of particular importance for further
debate over the problem of universals. A couple of minor critical comments con-
cerning some of Bochen´ski’s analyses are presented at the end of the paper.
Keywords Bochen´ski  Universals  Property  Identity  Nominalism 
Realism  Object
Introduction
In defiance of suggestions that may arise in connection with the title of this paper, I
am going to argue that throughout his entire creative life Jo´zef Bochen´ski
maintained a uniform metaphysical view with regard to universals. He was an
advocate of moderate universal realism, in contemporary terminology also called
immanent realism. The reason why two approaches to the problem of universals will
be discussed is that in his considerations on the subject, which he undertook
systematically on two occasions, Bochen´ski used two different methods and
manners of analysis.
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I am going to formulate and justify a few claims concerning Bochen´ski’s
metaphysical and methodological views presented in two of his papers, which deal
directly with the problem of universals, namely ‘‘Powszechniki jako tres´ci cech w
filozofii s´w. Tomasza z Akwinu’’ (Universals as contents of properties in St.
Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy)1 (Bochen´ski 1938, PTC for short) and ‘‘The
problem of universals’’ (Bochen´ski 1956, ZP respectively). Some of Bochen´ski’s
comments in two other papers, namely ‘‘Zagadnienie przyczynowos´ci u neo-
scholastyko´w’’ (Neo-scholastics on the problem of causality) (Bochen´ski 1935) and
‘‘On the syntactical categories’’ (Bochen´ski 1949) are also devoted to the topic. Due
to their subsidiarity the last two papers will not figure in my analysis.
It is worth noting that Bochen´ski’s inquiries about the existence and nature of
universals belong to the wider polemic context, which can be described as the
debate over universals in the Lvov-Warsaw School. Bochen´ski’s analyses—apart
from those of Ajdukiewicz (1930, 1932, 1934), Łukasiewicz (1910) or Borowski’s
(1921)—are located on the realist side and in opposition to the nominalist fraction
represented by Les´niewski (1913), Kotarbin´ski (1921),2 and Lejewski (1990).
Ontological individualism
Bochen´ski regarded the thesis of ontological individualism as the metaphysical
context for many philosophical considerations. The problem of universals was no
exception. The basic claim, speaking roughly, is that each object is an individual
object.3 This thesis should be distinguished from a similar nominalist thesis. Firstly,
the thesis of individualism does not exclude other ontological categories, in
particular, properties or events. Secondly, it does not exclude the existence of
complex objects, which have general, non-individual objects as parts. Rather, the
thesis is that among really existing objects (substances) there are no objects of a
general or abstract nature.
The thesis of ontological individualism is crucial for a proper understanding of
Bochen´ski’s metaphysical views. However, it may appear to be in conflict with
another thesis Bochen´ski held, namely, his claim that the world has a stratified
structure; it is composed of objects and properties, which characterize them
(Bochen´ski 1956 97). Now, the conflict is only apparent. According to Bochen´ski,
properties exist, but they are not things. Furthermore, as it will turn out later,
properties occur in many forms: they are both abstract contents and particular
qualities of objects.
The other important role of the thesis under consideration is that it stands opposed to
reductive analyses, typical of Polish nominalists who, following Twardowski
(Twardowski 1894), defined universals inter alia as general objects. According to
one version of the nominalist argument, a general object with respect to the set of
1 In Polish philosophical literature this paper has a short elaboration in (Wolak 1993, 141–143).
2 On additional information on Kotarbin´ski’s analyses see e.g. (Grygianiec 2001).
3 Compare Bochen´ski’s words in ZP, p. 79: ‘‘The author is of the opinion that every object in the
universe existing outside the mind is an individual object, not a general one.’’
28 M. Grygianiec
123
individual objects (at least two such objects) is an object which can possess only these
properties which are common to all individual objects in question (Kotarbin´ski 1921,
104; Les´niewski 1913, 142). Prescinding from numerous issues hidden in the above
formulation, it is worth noting that a universal is treated here both as an object and a
general object. Anyone who accepts the existence of universals has to either abandon
the thesis of ontological individualism or reject the above definition. It is therefore
entirely understandable why in PTC Bochen´ski emphasizes—following St. Thomas—
that ‘‘A universal is not a thing’’ (Bochen´ski 1938, s 138 and 139).
The thesis of ontological individualism likewise sheds light on the distinction
between properties as particular qualities and properties as abstract contents. I will
have more to say about this distinction below.
Immanent realism
In the debate on universals, immanent realism is—apart from nominalism,
conceptualism, and extreme realism—one of the four classic positions. This
doctrine is known also as moderate universal realism or Aristotelian realism. In
broad outline the idea is that: (1) universals exist; (2) they are ontologically
dependent upon objects which exemplify them (therefore they are not of a
substantial nature; they exist only in so far as they are instantiated); (3) they are not
of such a nature as to be necessary. As characterized, they are universals in rebus.
Immanent realists present considerable variation as to the more specific issues.
Indeed, the above general formulation of the doctrine does not resolve the following
issues: (a) how universals can be located in space; (b) whether they can enter into
causal relations; (c) whether they can be observed; (d) whether they are hierarchically
arranged; (e) whether there are conjunctional, disjunctional or negative universals;
(f) whether there are any formal relations between them (i.e. entailment or inclusion).
Both in PTC, ZP, and other papers, Bochen´ski has clearly stated his commitment to
immanent realism. At the same time he distances himself from the extreme version of
realism (Bochen´ski 1949, 278).4 Although Bochen´ski did not express his views
regarding many of these specific issues, besides recognizing the existence of
universals, he appeared to accept the exemplification principle5 and questioned the
substantial nature of universals. He was especially concerned with the last issue,
particularly in PTC, partly as a result of his polemics with Kotarbin´ski and Les´niewski.
The theory of universals in PTC
Bochen´ski begins the outline of the theory of universals by introducing an
appropriate language. The language includes the following syntactic categories:
4 Some researchers have suggested, however, that Bochen´ski was a supporter of the doctrine of Platonic
realism. Compare in this connection e.g. (Jadacki 1998, 379).
5 This principle says that only exemplified universals exist. On this subject compare e.g. (Armstrong
2001, 65–69).
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a) individual variables (‘x’, ‘y’);
b) two-place sentential functors (‘=’, ‘=’);
c) one-place first level functors (‘u’);
d) one-place second level functors (‘P’);
e) sentences (and sentence functions);
f) one-place sentence connectives (‘*’);
g) two-place sentence functors (‘?’, ‘^’);
h) quantifiers (‘V’, ‘A’).
The definition of a universal is the following:
(1) P(u) = Ax, y [(ux ^ uy) ^ x = y],
which should be read: ‘u is a universal’ is the same as ‘there are at least two
different objects x and y, such that x is u and y is u’.
The realist thesis has the form:
(2) AuAx, y [(ux ^ uy) ^ x = y].
This thesis should be read as follows: ‘There is at least one such u, that there are
at least two different objects x and y, such that x is u and y is u’.
The nominalist thesis would be negation of the thesis (2), thus:
(3) * {AuAx, y [(ux ^ uy) ^ x = y]}.
According to Bochen´ski, the following thesis can be obtained from statement (3)
deductively on the basis of any sufficiently developed two-valued system of logic:
(4) VuVx, y [(ux ^ uy) ? * (x = y)],
so the thesis, that ‘for any u and for any x and y: if x is u and y is u, it is not true that
x is different from y’ (Bochen´ski 1938, 147). According to Bochen´ski this would
lead to paradoxes: two white things (e.g. a wall and a lump of sugar) would have to
be identical; therefore, the names ‘wall’ and ‘lump of sugar’ would be names of the
same thing. Furthermore, the same conclusion could be drawn for any two things
with the same properties.
A substantial part of Bochen´ski’s paper is devoted to interpreting the concept of
‘universal’ on the basis of St. Thomas Aquinas’ text and to confront the
interpretation with possible reist objections.
According to Bochen´ski, the main difficulties concerning universals result, as
mentioned, from interpreting universals as things. St. Thomas’s texts give clear
solution: a universal is not a thing, but it is something which occurs in many things.
Therefore a universal is a property—universale non significat hoc aliquid, sed quale
(Bochen´ski 1938, 138).
Since a universal is a property (qualitas), and a property is a quality (accidens),
and the essence of an object is defined by universals, then the essence itself is
defined by qualities. The consequent of this conditional is not acceptable within the
framework of Aristotle’s and St. Thomas’s ontology. Therefore, among all the
qualities accidental qualities (qualitates accidentalis) have to be distinguished from
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substantial qualities (qualitates substantialis). Universals would constitute essential
qualities, although they still would be properties (qualitatis).
Kotarbin´ski’s arguments do not apply to universals interpreted in this way,
because he implies that a universal is a thing. However, the following difficulty
arises. It may be doubted not only whether there exist universals as things, but also
whether there are any universals as properties. Bochen´ski says that he is perfectly
certain about the existence of properties and if anyone doubts their existence this is
due to two misunderstandings.
First, reists, for example, seem to identify the mode of existence of properties
with the mode of existence of things. Bochen´ski writes that reists ‘‘seem to assume
that when we say ‘A property u exists’ we assign to the word ‘exists’ exactly the
same meaning which we associate with the equiform word when we read the
sentence ‘A donkey exists’ ’’ (Bochen´ski 1938, 139–140).6 According to Bochen´ski,
no supporter of universals claims something of the sort. It is worth specifying that
the function ‘a property u exists’ is tantamount to the function ‘there is an x, such
that a property u appears in x’—the function, which changes into a true sentence,
when we substitute a word for the variable ‘u’, for example ‘white’.
Second, reists confuse the problem of the mode of existence of properties and
things with the issue of the ontological difference between things and properties.
The second of the topics mentioned, which Bochen´ski takes to be much more
difficult than the others, is not connected with the issue of the existence of
universals.7
There is a further difficulty. St. Thomas recognizes the meaningfulness of
sentences the subject of which is the name of a universal. However, were a universal
a property, its symbol would rather have to be a functor, not a functor’s argument. It
seems that in order to remove this difficulty it is possible to eliminate the artificial
division into subject and predicate. For example the sentence ‘A human is white’
can without any complications be written as: ‘For any x, if x is a human, x is white’.
By that means, what had been a subject, is now a functor. Generalizing, we obtain
the following formula:
Everything that possesses a property u, also possesses a property w.
However, according to Bochen´ski, this approach is inaccurate. The point is that
our language is too imperfect ‘‘to […] be able to articulate and our mind to come to
know all reality […]’’ (Bochen´ski 1938, 148), including even the mere possession of
a property by an object. Apart from that, any property of a particular object is also
particular,8 whereas a universal is not of a particular nature. In the case of many
6 A similar view has been expressed by Ajdukiewicz—compare (Ajdukiewicz 1934, 196–210).
7 Bochen´ski writes: ‘‘And so this problem has nothing to do with our question, at least according to St.
Thomas, who, although he recognizes the ontological difference between properties and the things in
which these properties appear, when it comes to universals, however, he claims quite clearly that they
differ ontologically from things. Thus, for example, humanity is not different from a particular human. Of
course, a reist will advance the following complaint: if a property is ontologically different from a thing,
then how we can say that properties exist? But this objection demonstrates only that its author does not
understand what a property is.’’ Compare (Bochen´ski 1938, 140).
8 Bochen´ski writes: ‘‘There are no general properties at all, i.e. occurring in several different things in the
external world and each of them, as a result of bonding with that individuating factor, is strictly
individual, utterly different from any other properties.’’ Compare (Bochen´ski 1938, 148).
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objects what is general in property exemplification is a content of the property in
question, not the property itself. Therefore, universals are not simply properties, but
contents9 of these properties. This, in turn, would suggest that the terminology
introduced above is not perfectly adequate, because «the smallest» element of this
terminology is the notion of property, not the notion of content of a property.
Simultaneously this would also suggest that the terminology should be improved by
introducing symbols denoting contents of properties.
However, according to Bochen´ski, such an intervention is not necessary, because
our language is so structured that whenever we attribute properties to objects, we
likewise attribute contents. We must therefore accept the relative inaccuracy of
language. Consequently, according to Bochen´ski, there is no reason to distinguish—
on the level of formal reconstruction—a property from its content; ‘‘you only need
to remember that when we say ‘u is in x’ we always understand ‘u’ as a content, not
a real quality with all its elements, appearing with it in an object—because such
functors must not be used at all’’ (Bochen´ski 1938, 148–149).
The main objection to Bochen´ski’s conception is that his definition of universals
is too broad. In light of this definition, each property had by two non-identical
individuals is a universal. Whereas, in fact, every property is a universal. Therefore,
the following, preliminary question should be formulated: Are properties univer-
sals? In light of Bochen´ski’s analysis this question should be answered negatively:
properties are not universals; it is rather contents of properties that are universals.
In turn, the term content of a property—despite Bochen´ski’s assurances—still
remains unclear. Once we add to that the fact signaled by Bochen´ski himself—the
fact, namely, that contents of properties can only be expressed in the terminology of
properties—this confuses the matter even more. Moreover, we do not have any clear
criterion here by which to determine when a given statement is about properties and
when it is about the relevant contents of these properties. This observation is
important, because, after all, there may be contexts in which we would like to talk
about the properties, not about their contents. Therefore, there is—contrary to
Bochen´ski’s intentions—a need to for formal reconstruction of ontological issues,
both in the terminology of properties and in that of their contents.
The formulation of the problem of universals in ZP
In 1956, Bochen´ski returned to the problem of universals in ZP, where he attempted
to reformulate the relevant issue. Bochen´ski’s article appeared in connection with
the philosophical conference which took place in March of that year at the
University of Notre Dame, Indiana. The congress was devoted entirely to the
problem of universals and it two prominent philosophers took part: Alonzo
Church—a Platonist, and Nelson Goodman (Bochen´ski 1993b)—a nominalist.
Bochen´ski claims that each approach to the problem of the existence of
universals is relative to the chosen ontology. For his part, Bochen´ski assumes, as
before, ontological individualism. The problem of universals boils down to the
9 Bochen´ski stated a similar idea in (Bochen´ski 1935).
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simple question: ‘Do universals exist?’ The answer to this question, however,
depends on the meaning of the term ‘universal’. Bochen´ski lists five possible
‘‘strata’’ of reality to which the term is sometimes applied:
(a) linguistic symbols (inscriptions or sounds as physical bodies);
(b) subjective mental entities (ideas);
(c) objective meanings (Stoic ‘‘kejsa’’);
(d) phenomenal realities in the sense of Husserl;
(e) transcendent beings (existing outside of reality).
According to Bochen´ski, of those five ‘‘strata’’ the second and the fifth can be
immediately excluded, as they are not suited for investigating the problem of
universals. This is because subjective mental entities are real and concrete and
transcendent beings remain beyond our cognitive reach.10 Therefore, the problem of
universals is related to the three remaining ‘‘strata’’: linguistic symbols, objective
meanings, and phenomenal realities.
Bochen´ski assumes that a linguistic symbol can be considered as general if and
only if (at least) two symbols of the same shape (as the given symbol) are predicated
of two different objects.
This idea can be expressed more precisely as follows: for any x and y: x is a
general symbol of y if and only if there is at least one z, t, u w, such that:
(a) z and t are y-a symbols;
(b) x, z, t are equiform;
(c) z is predictated of u and t is predicated of w;
(d) u is different from w.
This can be written formally as follows:
(1) Vx, y {Og(x, y) : Az, t, u, w [zSy ^ tSy ^ zRx ^ tRx ^ zOu ^ tOw ^ t = u]}.11
In that case, according to Bochen´ski, two questions arises:
(a) are the general symbols components of any effective language12;
(b) what kind of general symbols have to be components of an effective language.
The first of these questions has an easy solution: in any effective language there
are some general symbols; for instance without general symbols no classification
would be possible. The second issue is much more complex, but also more
important for the problems in question here: any opportunity to get rid of the general
symbols (and hence, also, their meanings and denotations) from specific languages
would be tantamount to ‘‘cancelling’’ the problem for those languages.
According to Bochen´ski, this issue can be reformulated in the following question:
(b’) ‘does any effective language have to have a primitive syntactic category of
general terms’?
10 It can be added that transcendent beings remain beyond the perspective of ontological individualism.
11 Interpretation of symbols: ‘Og’ - ‘…is a general symbol’, ‘S’ - ‘…is a symbol…’, ‘R’ - ‘…is
isomorphic with…’, ‘O’ - ‘…is predicated of…’.
12 An effective language is the one in which it is possible to formulate science, including mathematics.
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In resolving this issue Bochen´ski focuses on one selected effective language,
namely, Russell’s and Whitehead’s Principiorum language. It includes the
following syntactic categories in it:
(a) individual variables: ‘x’, ‘y’…;
(b) one-place functors for names: ‘u’, ‘w’…;
(c) existential quantifier: ‘A’;
(d) sentence variables: ‘p’, ‘q’;
(e) two-place functors for sentences: ‘|’.
The problem of universals, according to Bochen´ski, arises with respect to
symbols of group (a), (c), (d), and (e).13 Therefore, it arises only in relation to the
symbols of functors with nominal arguments (‘u’, ‘w’…).
In the ‘‘kejsa’’ ‘‘stratum’’ the following further questions appear:
(a) are there any meanings at all?
(b) are there any general meanings?
Because the word ‘meaning’ is itself ambiguous its meaning has first to be
determined. Bochen´ski proposes to divide meanings into:
(a) syntactic meanings (the meanings of terms comes down to a set of linguistic
rules applicable to these terms);
(b) semantic meanings (syntactic rules do not exhaust meanings of terms; these
meanings are also determined by suitable interpretations of the given language).
Semantic meanings come in two varieties:
(i) operational semantic meanings14;
(ii) eidetic meanings.15
Bochen´ski’s approach with regard to the issue (a) can be expressed in the form of
the following statements:
(2) Some symbols have only syntactic meanings, and thus also:
(3) Some symbols do not have semantic meaning;
(4) Each symbol with semantic meaning has also operational semantic meaning;
(5) Some symbols have eidetic meaning;
(6) Some symbols do not have eidetic meaning.
13 Individual variables represent names of individual objects, the quantifier symbol is only used to
determine the existence of something without informing about its nature (in turn, general quantifier can be
eliminated by the existential quantifier and negation which, subsequently, is defined by the functor ‘|’),
symbols of sentence variables can be replaced by functors from the (b) group with individual names as
their functors. Symbol ‘|’ causes some interpretational difficulties not connected with the foregoing
matter.
14 It can be assumed that a given expression has an operational semantic meaning if and only if the
sentence with the relevant expression as a component has its method of verification (the meaning of
p = the method of verification of p).
15 The eidetic meaning of an expression would be ‘‘what is understood by a symbol’’ and thanks to which




To those who deny the existence of eidetic meanings, claiming that machines, on
the basis of stimuli replacing symbols, can behave just like people, Bochen´ski says
that ‘‘this has never been proved that it is possible in any case’’ (Bochen´ski 1993a,
88).
In addition Bochen´ski claims, that:
(7) ‘‘a direct overview of what takes place in us when we understand a symbol
leads us to adopt eidetic meanings’’;
(8) ‘‘there is no a pragmatic test for the opposite claim formulated by the […]
opponents’’;
(9) ‘‘the entire theory of verifiability is so hopelessly murky that we can not see
any reason that would lead us to accept something as poetic and romantic’’
(Bochen´ski 1993a, 88–89).
Now Bochen´ski transforms the (b) issue into the question:
(b’) are there are any eidetic meanings?,
which further divides into specific problems:
(b’1) which symbols of language must be considered as having eidetic meaning;
(b’2) on the assumption that there is a non-empty class of such eidetically
meaningful symbols, should it be assumed that the elements of this class are
unambiguous symbols, i.e. do two equiform symbols have to have the same
meaning?
Bochen´ski answers these two questions positively. First, it is not possible to
eliminate even one-place functors for names. For the metalinguistic rules the
following circumstance arises: metalinguistic sentences objectively refer to certain
bodies, namely to inscriptions; expressions of the type ‘shape of the letter T’ must
have semantic meaning, because otherwise we could not adjudicate ‘‘which pile of
dried ink is the letter t’’ (Bochen´ski 1993a, 90).
Second, the hypothesis about the ambiguity of equiform symbols is refuted by the
following arguments:
• assuming the ambiguity of symbols it would be difficult to explain the fact of
communication;
• the hypothesis about the ambiguity of symbols must itself be formulated in
unambiguous language, otherwise it would be inexplicable (would be babble).
However, with regard to the ‘‘stratum’’ of phenomenal realities, Bochen´ski
makes the following claims:
(10) ‘‘Some of our classifications of specific objects within scientific languages are
not completely arbitrary.’’
(11) ‘‘Whenever classification is not completely arbitrary, something in the
classifiable objects justifies the classification.’’
(12) ‘‘There are objects which are linked together in such a manner that this
relation justifies our classification.’’ (Bochen´ski 1993a, 92–94).
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Bochen´ski justifies claim (10) by the following simple thought experiment. Let
us assume that we are dealing with three arbitrarily specified objects: x, y and z, and
with three classes selected just as arbitrarily: u, w and v. Let us further assume that
in the considered domain the following statements are true:
(i) Ax (*ux ^ wx ^ vx);
(ii) Ay (uy ^ * wy ^ vy);
(iii) Az (uz ^ wz ^ * vz).
Our classification will be as follows:
• u = {y, z};
• w = {x, z};
• v = {x, y};
• *u = {x};
• *w = {y};
• *v = {z}.
It is easy to see that the assumed objects, classes, and statements are completely
arbitrarily. However, the classification itself, based on the assumed statements, is no
longer arbitrary: ‘‘if we classify objects in terms of v, it is not arbitrary that we lay
z aside,’’ it is something ‘‘which does not depend on our will’’ (Bochen´ski 1993a,
92–93). Justification of claim (11) consists in Bochen´ski’s rejection in this regard of
epistemological idealism and Platonism. Because claim (12) follows from claim
(11), it should be considered as well-grounded. And claim (12) says that there is a
relation which justifies our classifications. The problem of universals for the real
world ipso facto comes down to the question, what this relation is. Two competing
theories—the so-called similarity theory and the identity theory—answer this
question.
According to the similarity theory, a relation that holds between the classified
objects depends on their similarity (of course, it is a reflexive and symmetrical
relation). At the same time this theory denies that there is allegedly any total or even
partial identity between classified objects. Whereas the identity theory says that the
relation that binds classified items is the identity of ‘‘aspects’’ of these items (in
other words: the identity of some of their properties), where this relation holds
between these ‘‘aspects’’, not between the classified objects.
An important difference between these theories, according to Bochen´ski, is that
the identity theory makes ontological assumptions that the similarity theory does
not. This is because within the identity theory the existence of properties is assumed,
whereas in the similarity theory there is no such assumption. Indeed, some similarity
theories simply reject the existence of properties.16
A clear example of the similarity theory—according to Bochen´ski—is Les´niew-
ski’s ontology. In that theory, the world is presented as not stratified, deprived of
properties, consisting only of individuals. For this theory, there is a suitable criterion
for formulation, namely Quine’s criterion: ‘‘to be is to be the value of a variable’’
16 Hereby Bochen´ski takes Les´niewski’s ontology as an example. For a reconciliation of the identity
theory with nominalism in connection with Les´niewski’s ontology see (Sinisi 1962).
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(Bochen´ski 1993a, 96). According to Bochen´ski, Goodman and Quine interpret
functors not as variables but as ‘‘schematic letters’’ or ‘‘imitation letters,’’ indicating
thereby that they do not have correlates in the phenomenal world (Goodman and
Quine 1947). Bochen´ski claims that Goodman-Quine’s approach must be rejected
for two reasons. First, it is rejected on intuitive grounds; the world must be stratified:
when we find ‘ua’ to be true, there must be in the world something which
corresponds both to ‘a’ and to ‘u’. Second, as indicated above, each component of
an effective language can be effectively reduced by analysis to one of the five
syntactic categories of Principia: ‘x’, ‘y’…; ‘u’, ‘w’…; ‘A’; ‘p’, ‘q’; ‘|’. In turn,
individual names ‘‘can be replaced by descriptions, then the descriptions are
replaced, contextually by formulas containing only variables, functors, quantifiers,
and a vertical bar (Sheffer’s stroke)’’ (Bochen´ski 1993a, 97). Ultimately, all that can
be said about the world can be said with the use of functors; we do not need
individual names, they only play the role of variables as ‘‘empty places’’ (they have
a purely operational meaning).
In this case, since individual variables function only as ‘‘empty places’’ and—on
the basis of Quine’s criterion—nothing in the world corresponds to functors, it
would be consistently acknowledged that none of our assertions about the world
really assert anything. Bochen´ski rejects this conception, because it leads to extreme
scepticism. At the same time, Quine’s criterion must be rejected too: if the world is
stratified and is composed of at least two types of entities of different ontological
status, the expression ‘to exist’ in relation to these two types has to have different
meanings. Quine’s criterion, which can be used for individuals, is not applicable to
the ‘‘stratum’’ of properties; ‘‘because existence, in the case of property, is not the
value of variable, but is the determination of value for a variable’’ (Bochen´ski
1993a, 98). Bochen´ski writes: ‘‘So to say that there exists something that is denoted
by u, is equivalent to saying ‘Ax ux’, not to ‘Au ux’. The latter formula is deceptive,
because it seems to assign the same mode of existence to a property that is assigned
to value x. When we ‘Au ux’, a property is brought to an object’’ (Bochen´ski 1993a,
98).
Generally, Bochen´ski rejected the similarity theory for the following two reasons.
The first is the circumstance that ‘‘any clear statement about classified objects
becomes unmanageable and complex’’ (Bochen´ski 1993a, 99)17 For example, in so
far as an identity theorist would be willing to accept the sentence:
(13) Ax, y [ux ^ uy ^ x = y],
a similarity theorist would have to treat the sentence (13) as the abbreviation of
the following sentence:
(14) Af, g, x, y [fHg ^ fPx ^ gPy ^ x = y].
In the case of classification of three objects, a supporter of the similarity theory
would have to accept a very complex sentence:
17 According to Bochen´ski, the meaning of predicate symbols used in further statements is the same as
the meaning of relevant symbols used in statement (1).
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(15) Af, g, h, x, y, z [fHg ^ gHh ^ hHx ^ fPx ^ gPy ^ hPz ^ x = y ^ y = z ^
z = x],
while the following thesis would suffice for the identity theorist:
(16) Ax, y, z [ux ^ uy ^ uz ^ x = y ^ y = z ^ z = x].
Another reason to reject the similarity theory is that ‘‘the similarity theory cannot
be formulated in an other way than in terms of the identity theory’’ (Bochen´ski
1993a, 100), which is self-evident as soon as one investigates the construction of
formulas (14) and (15) above (de facto the similarity theory assumes the identity
theory).
However, the identity theory faces the following theoretical difficulty. Suppose
that the following statement is true:
(13) Ax, y [ux ^ uy ^ x = y].
Therefore, there are two non-identical individuals (x, y) which have an identical
property (u). Since the individuals (x, y) are not identical, there is at least one such
property (e.g. w) which is had by one individual and not by the second one. Then
suppose that in addition to the statement (13), the following sentences are true:
(17) Ax [ux ^ wx];
(18) Ay [uy ^ * wy].
Now let us call the ‘h’ property the property of ‘existing in x together with w’.
This property (of the second level) will be had by u in x, but not had by u in y.
Therefore, there is at least one such property h that h is had by u in x, but not had by
u in y. It follows from this further that u possessed by x is not identical with u
possessed by y. This is contrary to the initial findings. This example suggests that
identity with regard to individuals is not the same as identity with respect to
properties. The second identity (¼
S




w : Vh [h(u) : h(w)];
(20) u ¼
S
w : Vh {h [ j ? [h(u) : h(w)]}.18
It seems that the required definition should be formulated as follows:
(21) u ¼
S
w : Vx [ux : wx].
According to Bochen´ski, if statement (21), within the framework of ‘‘applied’’
logic entailed statement (13), the inconsistency indicated above would still remain.
The result of these considerations—according to Bochen´ski—is the thesis about
existence of two kinds of identity: N-identity characteristic of individuals (defined in
18 Bochen´ski writes: ‘‘If objects are, let’s say, scarlet, and thereby, scarletness is common to them, this
does not imply at all that each shade of scarlet in one case will be also the shade of scarlet in the second
case.’’ See (Bochen´ski 1993a, 103). Definability of ‘j’ in formula (20) is problematic; this symbol cannot
be defined extensionally without referring to formulas of the ‘ux ^ uy’ type.
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(19)) and S-identity characteristic of properties (defined in (20) and (21)). The
result is also a fundamental distinction between two ontological ‘‘strata’’:
the ‘‘stratum’’ of objects and that of properties. Yet a further result is the thesis
that extreme realism and nominalism fail to formulate the problem of universals at
all, whereas for an ontological individualist this issue is first of all the matter of
explaining the nature of identity.
Bochen´ski’s analysis of the problem of raises a few doubts. First, in my opinion,
Bochen´ski goes too far when he links Les´niewski’s ontology with the formal
features of Principia and with Quine’s ontological criterion as well as with Quine
and Goodman’s ‘‘Steps toward a constructive nominalism.’’ Quine’s criterion
concerns first-level theory, whilst in Les´niewski’s language it is easy to quantify
over variables of any type and in this connection the criterion in question should be
treated with reservation within ontology. Additionally, it is not prejudged whether
within ontology the range of quantification covers only the domain of individuals. In
ontology, as far as I know, a reduction of individual names to relevant variables and
functors, as proposed by Bochen´ski, cannot be carried out by means of descriptions:
this is due to differences in the syntactic construction of ontology and the Principia.
Furthermore Les´niewski—unlike Quine and Goodman—constructed systems of
universal importance, whereas Quine and Goodman attempted merely to provide
nominalist definitions of a few terms of predicate logic.
As far as the identity theory is concerned, in ontology, compared with the
predicate calculus, there are at least three kinds of identity. We can speak of singular
(ordinary) identity, ‘‘strong’’ (extensional) identity and ‘‘weak’’ identity.19 Perhaps
the different kinds of identity defined in Les´niewski’s ontology would allow for a
more accurate analysis of the problems associated with the identity and similarity
theories. Unfortunately, Bochen´ski omitted this possibility in his text. As for
quantification over properties, it can be argued—contrary to Bochen´ski—that such a
procedure does not have to mean reification of properties. This would be the case
were we to transform Quine’s criterion into a criterion claiming that to be a thing
means the same as to be the value of a quantified variable. Quine’s ontological
criterion is applicable only to existence, not to the nature of existing objects,
recognized as values of quantified variables.
Comparison of the presented approaches
The analyses presented above differ significantly, but they also have some points of
convergence that can easily escape attention when they are examined superficially.
But first let us look at some rather obvious differences.
Firstly, these reconstructions differ as to the purpose for which they were
intended. In regard to PTC, Bochen´ski’s clearly stated objective was to report and
interpret ‘‘St. Thomas Aquinas’ ontological theory of universals.’’ He considers it
19 The definition of singular identity: Va, b {a = b : [(aeb) ^ (bea)]}—a is the same object as b; the
definition of strong identity: Va, b ha•b : Rc {(cea) ^ Vc [(cea) : (ceb)]}—only each a is b; the
definition of weak identity: Va, b {asb : Vc [(cea) : (ceb)]}—only any a is b.
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approvingly, explicite confessing that he recognizes Aquinas’ approach to be the
‘‘solely accurate’’ one. The task of ZP—at least overtly—was not so much to
resolve the issue, but rather to formulate it clearly and unambiguously. Although the
results, which Bochen´ski obtained in ZP, suggest a realist solution, the analysis
itself can be can be regarded, to some extent, as ontologically neutral.
Secondly, both texts differ significantly in respect to the adopted method of
inquiry. In PTC this method is largely a historical analysis, supported with
ontological interpretations and reconstructions within first-level predicate calculus l
with identity. However, in ZP, the analysis is carried out only by logical analysis
supported with the formalism of Principia, but—and this is noteworthy—the
analysis goes well beyond the the first level language.
Thirdly, these papers vary in scope and granularity of the issues discussed. PTC
directly provides analyses and ontological conclusions, while ZP puts such
solutions—considered as possible—in the background, taking as its salient subject
matter the five aforementioned ‘‘strata’’: language symbols, subjective mental
entities, objective meanings, phenomenal realities and transcendent entities.
Therefore, in ZP, the subject matter is extended to a broad spectrum of semantic
issues.
Fourthly, both papers differ significantly in regard to the philosophical contexts
in which they were set. Regarding PTC, the immediate context of Bochen´ski’s
analysis are the philosophical discussions held within the Lvov—Warsaw School, in
particular, disputes concerning universals, involving Ajdukiewicz, Kotarbinski,
Les´niewski, Łukasiewicz, and Ingarden. By contrast, the analyses included in ZP
have a much wider context: they include not only the legacy of Lvov—Warsaw
School, marked by the references to Les´niewski’s approaches, but also refer to
discussions that took place in the first half of the twentieth century within
mainstream analytic philosophy.
Despite these differences, both papers have several features in common. First,
their tenor—explicitly in PTC, implicitly in ZP—is realist. In both texts Bochen´ski
represented himself as a moderate realist. Second, both papers reduce the problem
of universals to an adequate ontological interpretation of properties. Only the
manner of the reduction differs: in PTC it consists in extracting the notion of content
of a property from the notion of a property, while in ZP the method is to consider
identity for individuals and properties (vide: involvement of the term of S-identity).
Third, both papers are characterized by a fairly clear negative evaluation of
nominalists’ reconstructive efforts: in the case of PTC the reference is to
Kotarbin´ski’s analysis, while in ZP it is directed against the reconstructions by
Quine, Goodman, and Les´niewski.
Conclusion: the lesson from Bochen´ski
The question naturally arises whether Bochen´ski’s analysis presents, from the point
of view of a contemporary philosopher, any particular intellectual value. I daresay it
does. Here are some reasons why I think so. Firstly, the distinction, in accordance
with Aquinas, between particular properties and the contents of these properties
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anticipates, in my opinion, the doctrine which admits properties as tropes and
properties as universals as fundamental ontological categories.20 Incidentally, I
might add here that I support this view. There remains, of course, the question of the
coherent development of an approach of this kind, but Bochen´ski provided the
general outline.
Secondly, it is worth bearing in mind, even from a contemporary point of view,
that according to St Thomas whenever we attribute something to something we
attribute to it abstract properties (i.e. contents). Language is not and cannot be an
exact copy (model) of reality. Perhaps this fact is partly responsible for the ongoing
philosophical disputes within which the said complication is ignored. Although
Bochen´ski offers no recipes, he does provide a valuable diagnosis.
Thirdly, Bochen´ski rightly realises—while considering nominalist arguments—
that delivering appropriate paraphrases or accepting this or that formal reconstruc-
tion of everyday speach is not and cannot be in itself a solution to ontological
problems. An adequate paraphrase is always a symmetrical relation, and the
possible reconstruction of natural language based on the theory of syntactic
categories, which almost automatically allows for nominalistic reasoning, bears the
marks of the petitionis principii fallacy (Bochen´ski 1949, 278). Moreover, similar
reservations can be formulated not only with regard to nominalist attempts.
I would like to end my reconstructions of Bochen´ski’s analysis with two
additional comments.21 The first concerns the conception which maintains that there
is a difference between particular properties and contents of properties. Now one
can accept all of Bochen´ski’s findings in this matter but continue beyond the point
where he stopped. Because, contrary to Bochen´ski, we can, on the one hand, readily
accept the idea of language as an inaccurate copy of reality, but, on the other hand,
we need not refrain form exploring ontologically the difference in question.22
Bochen´ski did not do so.
The second critical comment concerns the concept of S-identity. I think that
Bochen´ski rightly sees properties as the core of the problem of universals when he
distinguishes the specific notion of identity for properties. However, I do not think
the very concept of S-identity is the key to solve the relevant problem. I suppose that
Bochen´ski’s recourse to this concept is the effect of having abandoned23—at least
implicitly—the distinction between properties as tropes and properties as contents.
In my opinion, the basis for further analysis of the problem of universals should be
sought precisely in this difference, not in S-identity.
20 For an approach of this type see e.g. (Lowe 2006).
21 In my opinion, the problem whether the thesis of ontological individualism does not conflict with an
immanent realism approach, and whether using some types of functors in a given language entails any
ontological commitments, requires a separate consideration. This last point is of particular importance in
light of the possibility, indicated by Bochen´ski, to paraphrase statements with general names into
statements without them.
22 An attempt of analyses of this kind can be found in (Lowe 2009, ch. 11 and 12).
23 Interestingly, there appears a distinction in ZP, footnote 5, between two concepts of property: property
as proprium and property as nota.
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